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In July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
a resolution that declared a human right to clean drinking water 
and sanitation.1  The resolution was approved by a vote of 122 to 
none.  41 countries abstained, including the United States, 
Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Japan.  Delegates from abstaining countries said that consensus 
was lacking, that the declaration was premature and in the 
wrong forum, and that the meaning of such a right in 
international law was uncertain.2
These objections reflect only part of the dispute over 
international rights to water.  Yes, consensus is lacking, but what 
is the nature of the disagreement?  Yes, this particular resolution 
may have been premature and in the wrong forum, given the 
process underway at the Human Rights Council, but some 
countries object regardless of the forum.  Yes, the meaning of 
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 1. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. DOC. 
A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/ 
Get?Open&DS=A/RES/64/292&Lang=E. 
 2. Press Release, U.N. Gen. Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Resolution 
Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right by Recorded 
Vote of 122 in Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions; Delegates Also Confirm 
Nominee to Head Office of Internal Oversight Services, Elect Belarus to UNEP 
Governing Council, U.N. DOC. GA/10967 (Jul. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10967.doc.htm. 
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such a right is uncertain, but it is not just uncertainty that makes 
it objectionable.  Reluctance on the part of many countries is well-
founded.  Simply put, an international right to water is a poor 
idea – well motivated but badly conceived. 
II. THE DARK IRONY OF INTERNATIONAL WATER 
RIGHTS 
International rights to water have a seductive appeal.  The 
argument goes like this: water is essential to life.  Therefore, 
people need access to water.  Therefore, they should have a right 
to be provided with an adequate supply.3  Enshrining a right to 
water in international law will enable them to get the water they 
need.4
The logic is flawed.  The case for water rights is not 
established simply from the fact that water is important and 
access to water is a serious challenge in many countries.
 
5
The ideology underlying the campaign for water rights 
contains two conflicting premises.  The first is that governments 
cannot be trusted to make clean water available.  Therefore, 
norms of international law must be brought to bear upon them.  
An international right is the means whereby national 
  
International water rights do not address threats to the 
availability of clean water – pollution, depletion, monopoly, 
corruption, conflict of interest and mismanagement – and could 
even exacerbate them.  The dark irony of international water 
rights is that they could frustrate the very objectives they are 
intended to achieve. 
 
 3. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Human Right to Water, in FRESH WATER AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 93, 93 (Edith Brown Weiss et al., eds., 2005) 
(“Humans need water.  We are composed mostly of it and cannot live for more 
than a few days without it.  It seems almost axiomatic, therefore, that there 
should be a human right to water.”). 
 4. Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 488 
(1999) (“By acknowledging a human right to water and expressing the 
willingness to meet this right for those currently deprived of it, the water 
community would have a useful tool for addressing one of the most fundamental 
failures of 20th century development.”). 
 5. The preamble to the General Assembly resolution notes that 
approximately 884 million people do not have access to safe drinking water and 
over 2.6 billion people lack basic sanitation. See G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 1. 
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governments can be held accountable.  The second premise is that 
only governments can be trusted to deal with water, and certainly 
the private sector cannot.6
III. THE MEANINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL WATER RIGHTS 
  The nature of the proposed rights 
implies that only governments may provide water, and therefore 
must do so in the form of water monopolies.  The possible 
interpretations and implications of international water rights are 
troubling. 
Proposals for international water rights tend to be 
ambiguous.  For example, consider the wording of the General 
Assembly Resolution cited above: “the right to safe and clean 
drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential 
for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”7
These interpretations are vastly different but none of them 
protect against actual threats to clean water, and indeed may 
make them more acute. 
  General 
Assembly resolutions do not create binding obligations per se, but 
similar language in a treaty could have at least three competing 
interpretations.  It could mean (a) that some countries can compel 
other countries to provide water and/or financial resources; (b) 
that individual citizens can require their own governments to 
provide water and sanitation; or (c) nothing in binding legal 
terms. 
A. An International Right to Water Could Mean That 
Some Countries Can Compel Other Countries to 
Provide Water and/or Financial Resources 
A right, by definition, is held by some parties against other 
parties.  International treaties are made amongst countries.  An 
international right to water could establish rights and obligations 
between countries rather than create enforceable rights that 
 
 6. See generally Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human 
Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L. Q. 957, 973 (2004) (discussing government 
regulation of private-sector activities that affect water quality and quantity). 
 7. G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 1. 
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citizens hold against their own governments, despite wording 
that implies a personal or “human” right to water. 
From the perspective of wealthy or water-rich countries, the 
risk of establishing international water rights is the risk of losing 
sovereign control over their own resources.  Governments failing 
to provide access to clean water to their citizens could insist that 
other countries supply them with water or with funding and 
technology.8  Freshwater resources could come to be regarded as 
common global resources for the benefit of all humankind9 rather 
than natural resources under the sovereign control of nations, 
giving credence to calls for international water transfers.10  A 
right to water could be interpreted as incorporating the principle 
of equitable utilization of resources, which has already been 
applied to freshwater flowing over borders,11 as well as to other 
natural resources such as biodiversity and the delimitation of the 
continental shelf.12  The Biodiversity Convention states that 
countries are to share the benefits from development of 
biodiversity resources “in a fair and equitable way.”13  The same 
Article states that countries continue to have sovereign rights 
over their natural resources, but reference to fair and equitable 
sharing raises the spectre of the argument that countries which 
host biotechnology development are obligated to share profits or 
rewards with other countries.14
 
 8. See Bluemel, supra note 6, at 998. 
 
 9. See generally Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic 
and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
 10. See generally A. Daniel Tarlock, Water Transfers: A Means to Achieve 
Sustainable Water Use, in FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 35 
(Edith Brown Weiss et al., eds., 2005); Edith Brown Weiss, Water Transfers and 
International Trade Law, in FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
61 (Edith Brown Weiss et al., eds., 2005). 
 11. David Freestone & Salman M.A. Salman, Ocean and Freshwater 
Resources, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
337, 351 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
 12. ELLI LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS, 
EFFECTIVENESS, AND WORLD ORDER 53-54 (2006). 
 13. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 15, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 
(1992). 
 14. Concerns of this nature have caused the United States to decline to ratify 
the Convention.  See LOUKA, supra note 12, at 54. 
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When freshwater is considered a national resource, the 
country within which the water is located can exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over its fate.  Water governance becomes more 
complicated when rivers or lakes flow across national borders,15 
or where jurisdiction is shared between different levels of 
government within a confederation of countries (e.g., the 
European Union) or federations of provinces or states (e.g., 
Canada or the United States).  But shared jurisdiction is simple 
compared to the governance challenges created by transforming 
freshwater resources into global common property.  No 
government would be able to dictate the fate of freshwater found 
within its borders.  Arid countries could acquire legitimate claims 
to a share of the resource.  The tragedy of the commons16 would 
beckon.  As governments rushed in to get their shares,17
B. An International Right to Water Could Mean That 
 
protecting water resources could pose legal challenges similar to 
those involved in protecting fish stocks in international waters or 
attempting to fashion collective action against climate change, 
which so far have proved to be insurmountable.  International 
water rights would have the practical effect of declaring open 
season on national water resources.  Contests between pressing 
human need and long-term ecological protection would be 
resolved in favour of the former, imperiling the long-term 
viability of the resource for the host nation.  National sovereign 
control does not make protection of fresh water inevitable, but 
does make it possible.  The same cannot be said if water is 
considered an international resource. 
 
 15. See generally Maria Manuela Farrajota, International Cooperation on 
Water Resources, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 337 
(Joseph W. Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta eds., 2009) . 
 16. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 17. Regrettably, wealth transfer may be the real motivation for some 
governments to pursue an international right to water.  One can see the intent 
in the second paragraph of G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 1, which “[c]alls upon 
States and international organizations to provide financial resources, capacity-
building and technology transfer, through international assistance and 
cooperation, in particular to developing countries, in order to scale up efforts to 
provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for 
all.”  Id. Paying money to governments of developing countries is not the 
revolution in governance that would provide greater access to clean water. 
5
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Citizens Can Require Their Own Governments to 
Provide Water and Sanitation 
An international right to water might be worded in terms 
that suggest citizens hold rights enforceable against their own 
governments.18  The declaration of individual rights in 
international law, such as the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained,19 is no guarantee of enforceability.  It is unclear what 
mechanisms could or should be used to implement such rights.20
Arguments in favor of free or inexpensive water seek to 
relieve hardship for the poor.  Free water for the poor is an 
attractive proposition because it appears to solve a pressing need 
in a single proclamation.  However, an obligation on the part of 
governments in arid countries to provide water for free would be 
not merely counterproductive, but could actually make it 
impossible to provide water for all.  Consumption of anything, 
including water, varies with price: lower price leads to higher 
consumption.  Where water is scarce, making it free or artificially 




The right to be provided with a government benefit, good or 
service is a “positive right.”  Traditionally, domestic 
constitutional rights are negative rights, such as the right to free 
expression, to be presumed innocent, and to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure.  The essence of negative rights 
is the right to be left alone, without intrusions from the state.  
Governments can generally comply with negative rights by 
 
 
 18. See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating 
Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 NW. U. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 345-349, 354-356 (2005); see also Erik B. Bluemel, supra 
note 6, at 963, 972-974. 
 19. See e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. DOC. A/RES/217(III), at art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. DOC. A/6316, at art. 9 
(Dec. 16, 1966). 
 20. See generally Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International 
Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and 
Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462 (2004). 
 21. Clean Water is a Right But it Also Needs to Have a Price, ECONOMIST, Nov 
9, 2006, available at http://www.economist.com/node/8142904. 
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inaction.  Positive rights, in contrast, consist of entitlements that 
governments must actively provide.22  Positive rights reduce or 
remove the economic incentive to produce goods and services.  
Legislated ceilings on the price of housing, food or water mean 
that producers of those goods make less money than the market 
would otherwise return to them.  Supply inevitably decreases.  
While governments have an unlimited capacity to provide 
negative rights, since they require merely that citizens be left 
alone, positive rights require governments to take from some to 
give to others.23  While negative rights place limits on the state’s 
ability to interfere,24 positive rights do the opposite.25
 
 22. For example, the South African Constitution provides a right to housing, 
health care, food, water, and social security.  See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 27.  
In October 2009, South Africa’s Constitutional Court decided Mazibuko v. City of 
Johannesburg, 2009 (3) SA 592 (CC) (S. Afr.).  The applicants were five 
residents of Phiri in Soweto.  The City of Johannesburg, one of the respondents, 
had established a policy of providing twenty-five liters of water per person, per 
day for free.  The applicants maintained that the policy offended Section 27 of 
the Constitution.  The trial court agreed, concluding that fifty liters of water was 
the proper amount.  The appellate court reduced this figure to forty-two liters.  
On final appeal, the Constitutional Court found that Section 27 did not require 
more free water than the city’s policy provided, and observed that courts were 
ill-equipped to make such decisions.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 
 23. Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 859 
(2001). 
 24. See Court of Appeal, Jan. 27, 2011, Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen. of Bots., 
CACLB-074-10 (Bots), available at http://assets.survivalinternational.org/ 
documents/545/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf. In  
Mosetlhanyane the Botswana Court of Civil Appeals recognized the right of 
Bushmen to use an old borehole to extract water for domestic purposes, 
overturning a government prohibition.  The case is likely to be interpreted as an 
endorsement of the concept of a right to water, but that would not be an 
accurate reading of the judgment.  Instead, the court essentially found that the 
Bushmen had the right not to be interfered with on the lands that they 
rightfully occupied.  Their right to use the borehole did not consist of a right to 
be provided with water, or to have the government cover the expense of using 
the borehole.  The court stated: 
[T]he appellants as lawful occupiers of the land in question merely 
seek, at their own expense, permission to use water from a discarded 
existing borehole for domestic purposes, something they had 
admittedly been doing before.  Indeed, it is not their case that they 
should be granted a water right to abstract water ‘at will, in 
unlimited quantities, from an unspecified number of boreholes.’ . . . 
All that they need . . . is permission to use the existing or an 
alternative borehole at their own expense and not Government’s 
expense. . . . Lawful occupiers of land such as the appellants must be 
7
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The case for free water rests on the argument that water is 
essential to life, and therefore it should not carry a cost.  But 
providing water is costly, particularly in urban areas – for 
regulating and enforcing watershed protection, for treating 
polluted water, and for infrastructure to deliver clean water and 
remove water waste.  A right to free water does not eliminate the 
cost of providing the water, but instead demands that it be paid 
by others, such as through general taxes or fees on some other 
commodity or service.  By so doing, an international right to be 
supplied with water incorporates a political ideology: water must 
be provided by government rather than by private means, and the 
costs of water systems cannot be borne by those who use them.  
Positive rights to water demand a socialized system of water 
provision, subsidized by some for the benefit of others.  An 
enforceable right of this nature would remove the democratic 
right of citizens and countries to determine the ideological 
premises of the water system they wish to run. 
C. An International Right to Water Could be Merely 
Symbolic, and Mean Nothing in Binding Legal 
Terms 
The history of international environmental law consists 
largely of grand declarations and feeble delivery.26
 
able to get underground water for domestic purposes, otherwise their 
occupation would be rendered meaningless.  
  Multilateral 
Id. at ¶ 16. 
 25. See generally Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, 2 E. EUR. CONST. 
REV. 35 (1993). 
 26. For example, the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 
15) (held in Copenhagen in December 2009 under the 1992 UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change for the purpose of negotiating a follow-up treaty 
to the Kyoto Protocol) ended in disarray and without agreement on even non-
binding, unenforceable greenhouse gas emission targets.  The following session, 
held in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010, concluded with a non-binding 
political agreement that called upon developed countries to honour and increase 
their commitments and developing countries to “take nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions.”  Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov.  29- Dec. 
10, 2010, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (Decision 1/CP.16), 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, ¶ 48, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/ 
cop16/eng/07a01.pdf.  After two decades of work on climate change, the prospect 
for binding commitments on greenhouse gases is grim. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/6
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agreements and resolutions often declare ambitious objectives but 
lack meaningful enforcement or accountability mechanisms.  
Rarely do they include sanctions such as trade measures to 
ensure compliance, or provide for binding adjudication with the 
ability to enforce judgments.  Achievement of goals therefore 
depends upon voluntary compliance of the parties at cost to 
themselves, and at the risk of non-compliance of others.  Not 
surprisingly, countries rarely comply in such circumstances.  
Instead, they act in their own national self-interest.  This 
behaviour is neither remarkable nor sinister.  Instead, it is 
precisely what one would expect from governments with 
mandates to protect the welfare of their citizens. 
A right to water that is unenforceable does not exist.  
International agreements that proclaim such rights misrepresent 
the state of the law.  Even in international law, no right can be 
relied upon in the absence of a remedy.  Recognition exists for a 
wide range of human rights, such as the right not to be 
arbitrarily detained27 or tortured,28
Advocates of international water rights have characterized 
their adoption as an essential first step towards reform.  The 
argument is that they express non-binding norms – statements of 
what the international community regards as proper or 
 but citizens in some countries 
do not actually have such rights.  If they did, arbitrary detention 
and torture would not occur without consequence.  Declaring 
rights that do not carry binding obligations may be detrimental to 
the purposes for which they are proclaimed.  Citizens may be 
duped into believing that they actually have the rights that are 
declared, and that such declarations are necessary and sufficient 
means of achieving them.  Declaring a right to water confuses 
legal norms with aspirations, and distracts attention from real 
work that must be done at national and local levels to reform 
governance. 
 
 27. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 19, at art. 9; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
supra note 19, at art. 9. 
 28. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 19, at art. 5; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
supra note 19, at art. 7. 
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desirable,29 even if they are not compulsory.  The expression of 
the right provides a common goal and a standard against which 
to measure the performance of national governments, even if 
some fail to achieve these norms in practice.30  Furthermore, 
where a domestic statute is ambiguous, domestic courts may refer 
to values and principles enshrined in international law to 
interpret the meaning of the legislation.31
The value credited to symbolic declarations is misplaced.  
Their role as important first steps is not supported by the history 
of international environmental law, which is littered with 
beginnings that did not lead to concrete measures.
 
32  In dualist 
states, the expression of an international right does not create a 
right in domestic law,33 and domestic statutes prevail in cases of 
conflict with international law.34
 
 29. John G. Merrills, Environmental Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 663, 666 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds,, 
2007). 
  Purely symbolic rights are as 
likely to relieve pressure upon governments as to increase it. 
 30. See Gleick, supra note 4, at 489, stating: 
What is the value of explicitly acknowledging a human right to 
water, as the international community has explicitly acknowledged a 
human right to food and to life? After all, despite the declaration of a 
formal right to food, nearly a billion people remain undernourished. 
One reason is to encourage the international community and 
individual governments to renew their efforts to meet basic water 
needs of their populations. International discussion of the necessity 
of meeting this basic need for all humans is extremely important – it 
raises issues that are global but often ignored on the national or 
regional level. Secondly, by acknowledging such a right, pressure to 
translate that right into specific national and international legal 
obligations and responsibilities is much more likely to occur. 
 31. See, e.g., R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, ¶¶ 53-56 (Can.); 114957 Canada 
Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Town of Hudson, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶¶ 
30-32 (Can.); Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 817, ¶ 70 (Can.); R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, ¶ 127 (Can). 
 32. The notable exception is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 33. See e.g. R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (Can.); Baker v. Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (Can.); Capital Cities 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Comm’n [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (Can.); 
Francis v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 618  (Can.). 
 34. RUTH SULLIVAN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 130 (1997). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/6
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IV. ALTERNATIVES 
While it is doubtful that international rights to water would 
help increase access to, or improve protection of water resources, 
an alternative roster of rights could be effective if it were to 
address real threats to water resources, such as pollution, 
depletion, monopoly, corruption, conflict of interest and 
mismanagement.  Access to clean water calls for a system of laws 
and responsibilities with the same features as those governing 
any other important matter: compliance with basic principles of 
the rule of law and democratic accountability, protection of 
citizens from the interference of others (including those who 
would pollute water and other common environmental resources), 
and protection of citizens’ access to goods and services by means 
of competitive markets and freedom to choose.  The rationale for 
rights is not simply that water is important, but that the main 
threats to water can be alleviated by establishing certain 
principles for the way it is governed. 
Clean water is a commodity.  While some can sink a well or 
throw a bucket into the local stream, in urban areas water must 
be collected, treated and delivered.  Should water be free because 
it is essential and therefore priceless, or should it be expensive 
because it is essential and therefore valuable?  The attempt to 
identify an abstract value for water is based on flawed premises.  
The proper price for any commodity depends upon supply and 
demand.  The classic example is diamonds, which have little 
utility but are very expensive due to their scarcity.  No 
justification exists for rights to be supplied with goods that are 
otherwise subject to competitive markets, such as food or housing, 
because the competitive market itself protects consumers from 
rigged prices, false shortages and inefficiency.  Any attempt by a 
seller of such goods to abuse customers would result in lost 
customers and improved business for the seller’s competitors.  
The only ‘citizens’ rights’ necessary with respect to such goods 
would be the negative right to be free from government 
intervention in the market, so as to prevent nationalization or 
monopolization from destroying the dynamics of competition.35
 
 35. People who are extremely poor have difficulty acquiring necessities such 
as water, food and shelter from competitive markets because they cannot afford 
 
11
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Maintaining a competitive market for the delivery of water in 
urban areas is challenging.  Building more than one set of pipes 
underground is rarely feasible.  Water delivery systems are 
commonly run as natural monopolies, and therefore are not 
subject to market forces.36
Where monopoly exists, legislating citizen rights may be 
necessary to counterbalance the monopoly’s market power.  The 
freedom to contract is meaningless where a monopoly is the 
legislated source of an essential good.  Monopolized water 
utilities, even when created by statute and subject to political 
supervision, cannot be expected to be responsive to customer 
demands or the discipline of competitive markets if their 
customers have no legal right to require the utility to meet 
certain price, service or quality standards.  If there is no market 
to set price, legislated rules should require price to reflect cost of 
  When only a single system of 
treatment and supply operates in an urban area, no competition 
is available to set a market price.  Monopolies restrict water 
access by dictating terms.  Urban residents can obtain only the 
water that the monopoly supplies, whatever the quality, and 
must pay whatever price the utility demands.  Even natural 
monopolies do not work well, regardless of whether the monopoly 
is public or private.  They tend to be inefficient and unresponsive 
to their customers.  They may charge high prices because there is 
no competition to set a market price, or low prices because there 
is political pressure to do so.  Neither outcome is appropriate.  
Public-private partnerships are vulnerable to having all the 
disadvantages of public and private monopolies – unrestrained 
profit-taking, inefficient management, use of public monies for 
private purposes, and little or no recourse for the citizen 
customer. 
 
to pay even competitive prices.  But the existence of poverty is not evidence of 
systemic flaws with the supply of these goods.  If stores are full of bread, the fact 
that a hungry man on the street has no money does not indicate that the price of 
bread is too high, or that the system of food production requires reform.  
Instead, it suggests the need for a social safety net to provide the poor with 
resources to buy bread from the store.  If the poorest people do not have money 
to pay for water, that is a problem attributable to poverty, not to a problem with 
water governance. 
 36. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Markets for Water: Time to Put the Myth to 
Rest?, 131 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 33 (2005). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/6
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provision and scarcity, getting as close as possible to reproducing 
the dynamics of supply and demand.  Regulation should be arms-
length – the operation of water treatment plants and pipelines 
should be separate from the supervision of the system, which in 
turn should be separate from the setting of standards that the 
system is expected to meet.  Only in this way is it possible to 
avoid conflicts of interest within the various arms of government 
that are empowered to control water.37
The better approach is to not monopolize water.
 
38  It may not 
be practical to build multiple sets of pipes underneath urban 
areas, but that does not mean that competition in treatment or 
delivery is not possible.39
 
 37. See Bruce Pardy, Myths and Legends, 9 CANADIAN WATER TREATMENT 7, 8 
(Nov.-Dec., 2009), stating: 
  Furthermore, where settlement is rural 
and people obtain their water via their own private or village 
wells, there is no rationale for monopoly. 
If those who set the standards also have the job of achieving the 
standards, then they will set standards that are within their 
capacity to meet even if that means water of questionable quality.  If 
those who enforce standards also operate facilities, then enforcement 
will be lax or non-existent.  These different functions should ideally 
be carried out by different levels of government; or, at the very least, 
by different government agencies willing to censure each other. 
 38. See ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, LIQUID ASSETS: PRIVATIZING AND REGULATING 
CANADA’S WATER UTILITIES 147 (2002), stating: 
In the best of all possible worlds, consumers would choose their 
water from a number of suppliers offering different qualities, 
services, and prices. Industrial consumers could reduce their costs by 
choosing interruptible supplies or less treated water.  Residential 
consumers could choose untreated water for their gardens and, for 
their personal use, could satisfy their preferences regarding taste 
and health concerns.  The choice between fluoridated and 
unfluoridated water, or between chlorinated water and that 
disinfected by other means, would be made by individual households 
- or, at least, neighbourhoods - rather than city officials. 
 39. For example, competition in water and sewer services has been 
introduced in Scotland under the Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act, 2005, 
(A.S.P. 3), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2005/ 
asp_20050003_en_3.  The Act authorizes the licensing of firms to enter into 
contracts for the supply of water and/or sewerage to particular premises.  The 
Water Industry Commission for Scotland claims to have developed a framework 
for water competition that allows customers to choose a supplier on the basis of 
service and cost.  See Competition, WATER INDUS. COMM’N FOR SCOT., 
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_Competition.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 
2011). 
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When water is captured, it becomes a private good.  Before 
capture, it is a common resource, flowing underground and in 
surface bodies towards the ocean.  Governments have a legitimate 
role to play, protecting both quality and quantity, so that there is 
clean water available for the taking.  This role is as protector, not 
provider.  All that is called for is to prevent pollution and 
depletion – not to actively provide water, but to protect the 
resource from interference from those who would impose 
environmental externalities upon it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Good water governance requires good governance, broadly 
conceived.  International water rights do not achieve this 
objective, and are likely to threaten the enterprise of protecting 
water resources. 
 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/6
